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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marco Jimenez appeals from district court's Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea
of Guilty to One Felony Count and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, I.C. § 19-2601(4),
I.C.R. 33(b), and Order of Commitment. Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court erred
in denying his request for funds to hire an expert to assist him in his motion to suppress
and with his defense. Mr. Jimenez further asserts that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. This Reply Brief is necessary to address some misconceptions
and arguments made by the State in its Respondent's Brief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Jimenez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Jimenez's request for
funds to hire an expert to explain factors that would affect Deputy Moore's ability
to perceive what he claimed he saw when Deputy Moore's purported
observations were vital to the district court's denial of Mr. Jimenez's motion to
suppress, in violation of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Right to due
process?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jimenez's motion to suppress as
Deputy Moore's suspicion upon which he justified his warrantless stop was not
objectively reasonable?

ARGUMENT

1

I

1

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jimenez's Reauest For
Funds To Hire An Expert To Explain Factors That Would Affect Deputv Moore's Ability
To Perceive What He Claimed He Saw When Deputv Moore's Purported Observations
Were Vital To The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Jimenez's Motion To Suppress. In
Violation Of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Riqht To Due Process
A.

Introduction
As articulated in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for expert funds that would have been used
I

1

to hire Dr. Marc Green, Ph.D., who would have provided testimony about factors that
would influence a person's ability to make the observations Deputy Moore claimed to

I

1

I

make, under the conditions upon which he claimed to make them. In addressing this

i

claim, the State incorporated the district court's memorandum decision and order and

1

attached the written decision as Appendix A to the Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's
Brief, p.7.) However, the State made further arguments in support of the district court's
finding.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.)

Mr. Jimenez now addresses the State's

additional arguments and clarifies his own.
B.

Because Mr. Jimenez Reauested The Funds To Hire Dr. Green With The Intent
Of Having Him Testifv During His Suppression Hearinq, Mr. Jimenez Concedes
That Detenninina Whether Dr. Green's Testimonv Would Assist The Trier Of Fact
Was Not, In And Of Itself, Inconsistent With The Olin Standards Under The Facts
Of This Case
In a footnote, the State asserts, "It is unclear to the state how, as Jimenez seems

to contend, the proffered testimony could fail to 'assist the trier of fact' under I.R.E. 702,
yet be considered 'necessary services' under I.C. § 19-852." (Respondent's Brief, p.9,

n.3.) Generally, by its plain language, where a criminal defendant requests funds to hire
an expert, the defendant must show neither that the expert will testify, nor that the
expert's testimony will be admissible, in order to satisfy the provisions of I.C. § 19-852.
I.C. § 19-852(a)(2) ("A needy person
committed

...

who is under formal charge of having

... a serious crime, is entitled ... to be provided with the necessary services

and facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation).")
Furthermore, the Rules of Evidence are generally not applicable in determining
preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine the admissibility of evidence when
the district court is the trier of fact. I.R.E. 101(e)(l); I.R.E. 104(a). However, in this
case, because Mr. Jimenez specifically requested funds to hire Dr. Green in order to
provide his testimony, he recognizes that the district court's consideration of whether
Dr. Green's testimony would "assist the trier of fact," in and of itself, was not
inconsistent with the Olin standards. Mr. Jimenez continues to assert, however, that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his request for funds.
C.

Despite The State's Apparent Arqument To The Contrarv. The District Court
Applied I.R.E. 702 In Rulinq On Mr. Jimenez's Motion For Expert Funds
The State appears to argue that the district court did not rely upon I.R.E. 702

when ruling on Mr. Jimenez's request for funds to hire Dr. Green. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.7-10.)

Initially, it should be noted that Mr. Jimenez does not (nor did he in his

Appellant's Brief) assert that the district court relied solely upon I.R.E. 702 "instead of
the due process and equal protection standard provided in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391,
394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982)." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)

In fact, Mr. Jimenez

recognizes that "the district court analyzed the claim in light of I.C. § 19-852 and Idaho
Rule of Evidence 702 ...". (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
However, the district court unequivocally relied upon I.R.E. 702 in ruling against
Mr. Jimenez's motion. While recognizing that the district court cited and quoted 1.R.E
702 in the "Applicable Law" section of its decision, the State argues that the district
court made no reference to I.R.E. 702 in its "Analysis and Decision" section.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8, 9 n.2.) The State is incorrect.
In the "Analysis and Decision" portion of its memorandum, the district court
stated:
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night
while the vehicles were passing each other and then through his rearview
mirror after the vehicles had passed can, if necessary to decide this case,
be determined by the court without the assistance of an expert
witness.
(R., p.78; see also Respondent's Brief - Appendix A; see also Respondent's Brief, p.10
(quoting the above section).) While it is true that the district court did not specifically
cite to I.R.E. 702 in its "Analysis and Decision" section,' the district court's chosen
words reveal indisputably that the district court applied 1.R.E 702, the evidentiary rule
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony, in ruling on its motion. (Compare
I.R.E. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise") with R., p.78 ("The accuracy of the deputy's
statements about what he observed that night

...

can

... be determined by the court

without the assistance of an expert").) In sum, the State's apparent assertion that the
district court did not employ the I.R.E. 702 standard, is without merit.
D.

Dr. Green's Testimony Would Assist The Trier Of Fact In Determininq The
Accuracy, Not Merely The Veracity, Of Deputy Moore's Testimonv, And The
District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denyins Mr. Jimenez's I.C. 6 19-852
Reauest
In addressing the claim raised by Mr. Jimenez in his Appellant's Brief that the

Idaho Rules of Evidence don't apply to preliminary questions of fact where the district
court is the trier of fact, the State argues that "even if the district court had based its
decision to deny funds for an expert witness at Jimenez's suppression hearing solely on
I.R.E. 702, such a ruling would not run counter to I.R.E. 101 and 104 -the admission of
Deputy Moore's testimony (vis-a-vis the weight) was not predicated upon the expert
witness's proffered testimony." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) The State further argues that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding "that the testimony of an expert to
challenge the credibility of Deputy Moore's observations at the suppression hearing was
not necessary." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) It is important to note that Mr. Jimenez did
not proffer Dr. Green's testimony to challenge the admissibility of Deputy Moore's
testimony, nor his credibility in the sense that he was committing perjury; rather, the
proffered testimony was centered upon whether Deputy Moore's claimed observations
were wrong due to the conditions under which the observations were made.

Counsel

for Mr. Jimenez argued:
The expert which I have contacted is an individual by the name of Mar[c]
Green, PHD. I attached copies of his curriculum vitae to my motion. . .
He's had research awards on special and visual affects, illumination on

'

The district court did not cite to I.C. !j 19-852 in its "Analysis and Decision" section
either.

pilot performance with the U.S. Air Force, he's also had a biomedical
science research grant on the effects of illuminants on the detection of
vertical and oblique stimuli. He's done publications on reaction time: Is it
a gun or a wallet, involving perceptual factors . . . He's also done work on
adaptation affects on the brightness and darkness of brief illuminate
changes, which is exactly what we are dealing with here.
(Tr., 3/9/07, p.17, L.18

- p.18, L.ll.)

Counsel for Mr. Jimenez argued that while the

court could determine the relative speed of the two vehicles and the lighting conditions,
Dr. Green's proffered testimony was not limited to making such determinations; rather,
Dr. Green's testimony would explain how these factors would affect Deputy Moore's
ability to make the observations themselves. (Tr., 3/9/07, p.15, L.3 - p.19, L.7, p.23, L.7

- p.25, L.20.)

As a parallel, where a defendant challenges the ability of a witness to

provide an in-court identification based upon a claim that the circumstances surrounding
a previous out-of-court identification were suggestive and create a substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification, the defendant does not challenge the "credibility" of the
witness in the sense that the defendant avers the witness is intentionally lying; rather,
the defendant challenges the "credibility" of the identification itself, i.e., whether it
stemmed from the witness's actual observations or from the suggestions inherent in the
conduct of the out-of-court identification process. See generally, Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188 (1972).

While the court (and the State) were correct in their observations that the "speed
and distance dynamics were already before the court" (Respondent's Brief, p.10), the
"adaptation affects on the brightness and darkness of brief illuminate changes," for
example, were not. The credibility issue the district court was required to determine
was Deputy Moore's capacity to make the purported observations, not his veracity for
either testifying truthfully or lying to justify his illegal action. Mr. Jimenez's arguments in

support of a finding that Dr. Green's testimony would, in fact, assist the trier of fact are
more fully articulated in the Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in further detail
in this Reply Brief.
II.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Jimenez's Motion To Suppress As Deputy
Moore's Suspicion Upon Which He Justified His Warrantless Stop Was Not Obiectively
Reasonable
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez asserted, as he does now, that "taking all of

Deputy Moore's statements as true, he lacked an objectively reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop the car in which Mr. Jimenez was riding." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1819.) In its Respondent's Brief, the State summarily describes Deputy Moore's purported

observation of the actions of the passengers as "panicked scrambling action," while
concurrently attacking Mr. Jimenez's summary description of Deputy Moore's purported
observations as "nervousness" and asserts that Mr. Jimenez's argument "strains
credulity." The State's argument is without merit.
B.

Renardless Of Whether The Actions Alleged To Have Been Seen Bv Deputy
Moore Are Described As "Nervousness" Or "Panicked Scramblina," Deputy
Moore Did Not Have A Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That The Occupants Of
The Car He Stowed Without A Warrant Were Involved In The Robbberv
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez summarized Deputy Moore's observations

and asserted that he merely had a hunch that the occupants of the car he stopped were
involved in the robbery, and did not have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion
of the same. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-28.) Regarding Deputy Moore's observations of
the occupant's of the car (the observations that he made in an instant, at night, going

from darkness into an artificially lit area of the highway, traveling at a relative 112 feet
per second, first toward, and then away from him), Mr. Jimenez asserted that
"[p]resumably, Deputy Moore found that the passengers were nervous because they
saw he was a cop." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) The State takes issue with this argument.
The State asserts that, in making this argument, Mr. Jimenez was merely setting
up a "straw man" and further that this argument "strains credulity." (Respondent's Brief,
pp.20, 21.)

The State asserts, "Deputy Moore's testimony did not describe mere

'nervousness' or vaguely relate he had seen 'furtive' movements by the occupants in
the vehicle." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) Rather, the state argues, "Deputy Moore's
testimony clearly described a scene of panicked scrambling action on the part of the
four men inside the vehicle."

(Respondent's Brief, p.21 (emphasis added).)

Mr. Jimenez must admit that Deputy Moore never used the term "nervous" in his
description of the occupants of the car.

However, he also never used the words,

"panicked" or "scrambling," either alone or in concert. (See Tr., 4/16/07 p.48, Ls.13-22;
p.55, L.7

- p.56, L.4 as cited in the Respondent's Brief, p.21.)

court. (Tr., 4/16/07, p.84, L . l l

- p.90, L.lO.)

Neither did the district

The district court found, "this officer saw

all four turn and look at him as he went by at a relatively slow speed; and then
according to this officer these individuals acted particularly nervous, like moving in
excitement ...". (Tr., 4/16/07, p.88, Ls.22-25 (emphasis added) see also Respondent's
Brief, p.17 (including the above quotation).) Thus, even if describing the passengers as
engaging in "panicked scrambling action" were enough to overcome the presumption
that the warrantless seizure was unreasonable, Deputy Moore did not describe, nor did
the district court find, that the passengers were engaged in such behavior.

Regardless of whether Deputy Moore, as argued by the State, described the
passengers as engaged in "panicked scrambling action" or whether Deputy Moore, as
argued by Mr. Jimenez and found by the district court, described some degree of
"nervousness," this Court must determine whether the facts as found by the district
court, and reviewed under a totality of the circumstances, show that Deputy Moore had
an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the car he stopped
without a warrant were involved in the robbery. Mr. Jimenez's argument in support of a
finding that Deputy Moore's suspicion was no more than a hunch and that he therefore
violated Mr. Jimenez's right to be free from unreasonable seizures, is more fully
articulated in the Appellant's Brief.
C.

Deputv Moore Did Not Observe Anv Of The Passenaers In The Car Remove
Clothing, Hide Weapons. Or Secure Items They Did Not Want Found
One more point alluded to in the Respondent's Brief needs to be clarified.

Deputy Moore did not testify that he observed any of the passengers of the car actually
"remov[ing] clothes, hid[ing] weapons, [or] secur[ing] items that they [did not] want to be
found." (Tr., 4/16/07, p.56, Ls.1-4.) The State references Deputy Moore's testimony on
this subject and recognizes that, according to Deputy Moore, the conduct only
"suggested" the passengers "might be" removing clothing, hiding weapons, or securing
items they did not want found, but did not assert that he actually observed any nefarious
hiding, etc. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16, 18, 21.) However, Mr. Jimenez asserts that the
speculative nature of Deputy Moore's testimony must be emphasized. Deputy Moore
merely stated that that hiding weapons etc. is one possible reason for people to "[jump]
around or [move] around in a car really fast." (Tr., 4/16/07, p.55, L.19

- p.56,

L.4.)

Even through his training and experience, Deputy Moore's observation of what people
who 'lump around in a car really fast" might "possibly" be doing is the definition of a
hunch.

-

I

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction, reverse the district court's order denying his request for appropriation of
funds for an expert, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, and remand

1

I

the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 3othday of December, 2008.

~ / ~ uState
t ~ Appellate Public Defender
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